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THE JUDICIAL DISABLING OF THE EMPLOYMENTDISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS OF THE AMERICANSWITH DISABILITIES ACT*By Charles B. Craver**
I.   INTRODUCTIONOn July 26, 1990, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was signed into law bythen President George Bush.1  The ADA constitutes the most extensive disability civil rights lawever enacted.2  It provides extensive protection against various types of discrimination forindividuals with serious physical and mental disabilities. At the official signing ceremony,President Bush described the ADA as “the world’s first comprehensive declaration of equalityfor people with disabilities.”3The primary impetus for the ADA was the historic societal discrimination againstindividuals with disabilities. Congress acknowledged that “some 43,000,000 Americans have oneor more physical or mental disabilities, and this number is increasing as the population as awhole is growing older.”4 Congress further stated that “historically, society has tended to isolateand segregate individuals with disabilities, and, . . . such forms of discrimination againstindividuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem.”5  Two-thirds of all disabled Americans between the age of 16 and 64are not working at all; yet, a large majority of those not workingsay that they want to work. Sixty-six percent of working-agedisabled persons, who are not working, say that they would like tohave a job. Translated into absolute terms, this means that about8.2 million people with disabilities want to work but cannot find ajob.6In addition, Congress recognized that disabled persons constitute a “discrete and insular minority
2who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposefulunequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society . . .”7 People with disabilities occupy inferior positions socially and economically. They are muchpoorer and less well educated than non-disabled persons.8 Congress further realized that publicfears, misperceptions, and ignorant stereotypes regarding the disabled were so commonplace thatsocietal discrimination adversely affected many people who were not truly disabled.9 Congressthus decided to extend statutory protection not only to persons with actual disabilities, but also toindividuals with records of prior disabilities who are no longer significantly inhibited by theirprevious conditions and persons who are regarded by others as being disabled even when they arenot.10 Although other sections of the ADA proscribe discrimination with respect to such areasas public transportation11 and public accommodations,12 Title I expressly prohibits discriminationagainst disabled individuals in employment.13 When it was enacted, disability rights advocateshoped this new statute would provide disabled persons with expansive protection against variousforms of employment discrimination. Their expectations have unfortunately not been realized. Aseries of recent Supreme Court decisions have narrowed the scope of ADA coverage to severelylimit statutory protection to individuals with relatively severe disabilities.This article will explore the propriety of the Supreme Court’s ADA decisions concerningtheir impact on employment discrimination coverage. It will suggest alternative approaches thatwould be more consistent with both the express statutory provisions and the underlyinglegislative intent. Part II will review the basic scope of ADA employment discriminationcoverage. Part III will then evaluate the way in which Supreme Court decisions have defined and
3restricted ADA coverage. In Part IV, I will indicate how I think the Supreme Court shouldinterpret the applicable ADA provisions.
II.   SCOPE OF ADA EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION COVERAGEThe employment discrimination provisions of the ADA cover employers with fifteen ormore regular employees, employment agencies, and labor organizations.14 No regulated entity“shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability ofsuch individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge ofemployees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges ofemployment.”15 Covered parties are required to make “reasonable accommodations” for knownphysical or mental limitations that will enable disabled persons to perform the essential functionsof jobs, where such accommodations can be accomplished without undue hardship on theoperation of the business.16 These provisions expressly proscribe discriminatory treatment that iseffectuated because of disabling conditions.17 The statute also prohibits disparate impactdiscrimination that results – whether intentionally or inadvertently – from facially-neutralemployment criteria that cause the disqualification of disproportionate percentages of disabledpersons, unless the covered entities can demonstrate that the challenged factors are job-relatedand consistent with business necessity.18 When employment tests are used, they must beadministered to disabled individuals in a manner that ensures that the results accurately reflectthe actual capabilities of these persons despite their impairments.19To protect employment applicants who do not have obvious impairments from possibledisability discrimination, the ADA prohibits pre-employment medical examinations and pre-
4employment inquiries concerning applicant medical conditions.20 Pre-employment medicalexaminations may only be undertaken after job offers have been made, all new employees aresubject to such examinations, the medical information obtained is kept confidential in separatemedical files, and the medical information is not used to discriminate against qualifiedindividuals because of their disabling conditions.21 While general medical questions may not beasked of job applicants, employers may describe the job-related functions for the positions inquestion and ask prospective employees whether they could perform those tasks.22 Onceemployees begin to work for covered firms, post-employment medical examinations may not berequired – they may only be conducted on a voluntary basis.23The three critical inquiries under the applicable employment discrimination provisionsconcern: (1) who are “disabled” individuals under the statute; (2) which disabled individuals are“qualified” for the positions in question; and (3) what “reasonable accommodations” may enabledisabled persons to perform the essential functions of those positions. The ADA contains a three-part definition of “disability:”The term “disability” means, with respect to an individual –      (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;       (B) a record of such an impairment; or       (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.24This definition was taken almost verbatim from the Rehabilitation Act.25  Under the first prong,individuals with current impairments that substantially limit any major life activity are protected.The second prong applies to persons who previously suffered from disabling conditions of a
5substantially limiting nature, and have records of such, but who are no longer substantiallylimited. The third prong includes individuals who do not have disabling conditions, but areerroneously thought to have one. They may have impairments that are not substantially limiting,but employers believe those conditions cause them to be substantially limited. They mayalternatively have no impairments, but employers incorrectly think they have conditions which, ifthey had them, would be substantially limiting. If an individual’s situation falls within any prong,that person is entitled to ADA coverage.26Although Congress failed to provide definitions of “substantially limits” or “major lifeactivities,” it suggested that the definitions previously established by agencies empowered toenforce different provisions of the Rehabilitation Act should be applied to ADA cases.27Department of Health, Education & Welfare (HEW) regulations promulgated under theRehabilitation Act define “physical and mental impairments” to include physiological disorders,cosmetic disfigurements, and anatomical losses affecting neurological, musculoskeletal, sensory,respiratory, cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin,and endocrine systems and mental retardation, organic brain syndrom, emotional or mentalillness, and specific learning disabilities.28 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)regulations adopted pursuant to ADA administrative authorization have adopted this HEWapproach.29 Relevant Rehabilitation Act regulations define “major life activities” to include“functions such as caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,speaking, breathing, learning, and working.”30 ADA committee reports expressly endorsed theseadministrative interpretations.31EEOC regulations define the term “substantially limits” to cover individuals who are
6unable to perform a major life activity that average persons in the general population can performor who are significantly restricted as to the manner under which they can perform a major lifeactivity compared to the manner under which average people in the general population canperform the same major life activity.32 When determining whether disabling conditions aresubstantially limiting, EEOC regulations indicate that three factors should be considered: “(i)[t]he nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) [t]he duration or expected duration of theimpairment; [and] (iii) [t]he permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or longterm impact of or resulting from the impairment.”33Under the ADA, a “‘qualified individual with a disability’ means an individual with adisability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functionsof the employment position that such individual holds or desires.”34 “Reasonableaccommodations” include ready accessibility for disabled persons, job restructuring, part-time ormodified work scheduling, reassignment to vacant positions, acquisition or modification ofequipment, the provision of readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations.35  Theterm “undue hardship” means “an action requiring significant difficulty or expense, whenconsidered in light of . . . – (i) the nature and cost of the accommodation . . .; (ii) the overallfinancial resources of the facility or facilities involved . . .; the number of persons employed atsuch facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise . . . upon theoperation of the facility; (iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall sizeof the business . . ., with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type, and locationof its facilities; and (iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including thecomposition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such entity . . .”36
7The employment discrimination provisions of the ADA are enforced against privatesector parties through the procedures set forth in Section 706 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Actof 1964.37 Persons who believe they have been discriminated against must file charges with theEEOC, which tries to conduct investigations and determine whether it appears that violationshave occurred. If EEOC investigators find cause to believe unlawful discrimination has takenplace, the EEOC may decide to sue on behalf of the claimants. In most cases, however,regardless of whether the EEOC investigators have found cause or no cause to thinkdiscrimination has occurred, the agency issues right-to-sue letters informing the claimants oftheir right to file law suits.
III.   SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF ADA COVERAGEThe most pertinent pre-ADA case decided by the Supreme Court was School Board ofNassau County v. Arline,38 a case that arose under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,39 whichprohibits federal fund recipients from discriminating against “otherwise qualified” individualswith disabilities.40 Arline was an elementary school teacher. She had tuberculosis thatoccasionally became contagious. After her third contagious incident within two years, the schooldistrict terminated her employment. She brought a Rehabilitation Act suit. The Arline Court had to initially decide whether a person with a contagious diseaseshould be considered a “handicapped [now ‘disabled’] individual.” The Court acknowledged twoimportant factors. First, that contagious conditions that affect fundamental body systemsconstitute covered impairments.41 The Court also recognized the validity of the HEW regulationdefining “major life activities,” used in the Rehabilitation Act definition of “handicap,” to
8include “working.”42 “Congress plainly intended the Act to cover persons with a physical ormental impairment . . . that substantially limited one’s ability to work. ‘[T]he primary goal of theAct is to increase employment of the handicapped’.”43Although the Court found Arline to be disabled by her contagious disease, it did notdecide that she was entitled to her former teaching position. It held that she could only prevail ifshe could demonstrate that despite her condition she was “qualified” to teach elementary school.The Court indicated that the lower courts had to make an individualized assessment of thepotential impact of Arline’s contagious disease on others to determine if she was “qualified.”44Borrowing from an amicus brief filed by the American Medical Association, the Arline Courtarticulated the standards to be applied to such inquiries:[Findings of] facts, based on reasonable medical judgments giventhe state of  medical knowledge, about (a) the nature of the risk(how the disease is transmitted), (b) the duration of the risk (howlong is the carrier infectious), (c) the severity of the risk (what isthe potential harm to third parties), and (d) the probabilities thedisease will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees ofharm.45Given the real risk of tuberculin contagion and the severe nature of the potential harm to othersexposed, it was evident that school teachers with such contagious diseases would not beconsidered “qualified” under the Rehabilitation Act. Except in unusual situations, noaccommodation could be made for such teachers that would enable them to perform their regularduties without undue rick of harm to others.Following the Arline decision, many people erroneously thought that the Supreme Courthad held that persons with contagious tuberculosis could work as school teachers. They failed toappreciate the fact that contagious people would not be “qualified” to work with others who
9might become infected by their disease. In response to this public outcry, Congress amended theRehabilitation Act to explicitly indicate that persons who have “currently contagious” diseases orinfections are not covered by the employment provisions of that enactment.46 This legislativechange was specifically limited to contagious conditions that would pose a serious risk of harmto others. It did not otherwise alter the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Arline. As aresult, claimants found to have covered disabilities must still prove that, with or withoutaccommodations, they are “qualified” to perform the positions in question.The first major Supreme Court decision interpreting the disability provisions of the ADAdid not involve an employment dispute; it concerned an asymptomatic HIV infected individualwho had been denied regular treatment at a dental office.47 The Bragdon Court initially noted thatthe ADA’s disability definition was taken almost verbatim from the definition contained in theRehabilitation Act, and it recognized that “Congress’ repetition of a well-established term carriesthe implication that Congress intended the term to be construed in accordance with pre-existingregulatory interpretations.”48 The Court also noted the ADA provision indicating that ADAsections are to be interpreted in conformity with regulations issued by Federal agencies under theRehabilitation Act.49The Bragdon Court next reviewed the HEW regulation indicating that covered physicalimpairments include those affecting the reproductive system.50 Since the Court found that“[r]eproduction and the sexual dynamics surrounding it are central to the life process itself,” itagreed that reproduction constitutes a “major life activity.”51 It next found that HIV infectedpersons are substantially limited in their ability to reproduce due to the threat to their sexualpartners and to children born to HIV infected mothers.52 The claimant thus had a condition that
10substantially limits a major life activity within the meaning of the ADA. Although the Bragdoncase did not involve employment rights, it is interesting to note that the Supreme Courtapprovingly cited an EEOC regulation indicating that asymptomatic HIV infected peopleconstitute covered persons.53The first coverage decisions arising under the employment discrimination provisions ofthe ADA were issued in 1999. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.54 Concerned twin sisters whoapplied to become global pilots with United. Both suffered from severe myopia which causedeach to have uncorrected visual acuity of 20/200 in one eye and 20/400 in the other. Nonetheless,with corrective lenses, they both had at least 20/20 vision in both eyes. Although they both metUnited’s other global pilot requirements, they were denied consideration for positions by virtueof a company policy requiring uncorrected visual acuity of at least 20/100. They then broughtclaims under the ADA.The Sutton Court had to initially decide whether mitigating measures, such as correctivelenses and prescription medication, should be considered when determining whether particularconditions substantially limit major life activities. It noted that a regulation promulgated by theEEOC pursuant to its administrative authority to interpret the employment discriminationprovisions of the ADA expressly stated that “[t]he determination of whether an individual issubstantially limited . . . must be made on a case by case basis, without regard to mitigatingmeasures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices.”55 The Court indicated that whiledifferent administrative agencies had been given the authority to issue interpretative regulationspertaining to their respective sections of the ADA, none was empowered to issue regulationsconcerning the generally applicable provisions which contained the statutory definition of
11“disability.”56 The Court thus questioned the propriety of administrative regulations definingdisabling conditions. This was a somewhat surprising observation, because it would precluderelevant administrative agencies from issuing regulations that could be used to initially determinewhether individuals raising claims under the different parts of the ADA are subject to disabilitycoverage. Perhaps recognizing this anomaly, the Court decided to evaluate the appropriateness ofthe EEOC regulation as if it had been properly promulgated.The Sutton Court considered the overall framework of the ADA and concluded that theEEOC regulation constituted an impermissible interpretation of the Act’s scope. JusticeO’Connor, writing for the seven-Justice majority, stated that “it is apparent that if a person istaking measures to correct for, or mitigate, a physical or mental impairment, the effects of thosemeasures – both positive and negative – must be taken into account when judging whether thatperson is ‘substantially limited’ in a major life activity. . .”57 She emphasized the fact that theADA is phrased in the present verb tense, and concluded that “[a] disability exists only where animpairment ‘substantially limits’ a major life activity, not where it ‘might,’ ‘could,’ or ‘would’ besubstantially limiting if mitigating measures were not taken.”58 Justice O’Connor also noted thatthe ADA requires an individualized determination of disability status, and suggested that theEEOC guideline mandating that disability coverage be evaluated without regard to mitigatingmeasures runs counter to the need for an individualized assessment.59The final factor undermining the propriety of the EEOC regulation concerned thestatement in the congressional findings section of the ADA indicating that “some 43,000,000Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities.”60 Justice O’Connor reasoned that ifeveryone with medical conditions controlled through eyeglasses, prostheses, and medications
12were considered disabled, far more than 43,000,000 people would be included; over 160,000,000persons would be covered.61 She thus found that the EEOC regulation did not constitute apermissible interpretation of the ADA’s disability definition.Dissenting Justices Stevens and Breyer disagreed with this portion of the majoritydecision. They cited comments in the House and Senate reports indicating that disabilitydeterminations should be made without consideration of mitigating measures.62 Since theythought that the EEOC regulation reflected this legislative intent, they argued that it should havebeen sustained.Although the Sutton majority rejected the claimants’ assertion that they were entitled toprotection under the first prong of the statutory definition of disability, due to their normal visualacuity in the corrected state, it still had to determine whether they were protected under the thirdprong as persons who were “regarded as” disabled by United. There was no doubt that they hadbeen rejected for global pilot positions because of their uncorrected visual capabilities. Did thismean that United regarded them as “disabled”? Justice O’Connor held no, by restricting thescope of the third prong:There are two apparent ways in which individuals may fall within[the “regarded as”] definition: (1) a covered entity mistakenlybelieves that a person has a physical impairment that substantiallylimits one or more major life activities, or (2) a covered entitymistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairmentsubstantially limits one or more major life activities.63The Court thus had to determine whether United believed that the claimants’ correctable myopiasubstantially limited them with respect to a major life activity.The Sutton majority acknowledged that the applicable EEOC regulation states that
13working constitutes a major life activity.64 The Court questioned whether working should reallybe considered a major life activity, pointing out that even the EEOC regulation treats working asa “residual life activity” that should be “considered, as a last resort, only ‘[i]f an individual is notsubstantially limited with respect to any other major life activity.’”65 The Court wholly ignoredthe fact that it had previously recognized in the Arline case that working was a “major lifeactivity” under the Rehabilitation Act.66 Nonetheless, the Court assumed that working constituteda major life activity for purposes of resolving the Sutton case.The EEOC regulation only considers impairments to be substantially limiting with respectto the ability of persons to work when their conditions significantly restrict their capacity “toperform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to theaverage person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single,particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.”67Justice O’Connor indicated that while Congress had acknowledged that the potential negativeimpact of societal myths regarding the actual capabilities of persons with mental or physicalimpairments could be as handicapping as real disabilities, it did not intend to preclude employersfrom establishing valid employment standards that might adversely affect some people withmedical conditions – so long as these criteria do not substantially limit their opportunities towork.68 United’s visual acuity standard clearly disadvantaged the Sutton claimants, but it did notdisqualify them from a class or range of jobs. It merely prevented them from becoming globalpilots. They retained the capacity to function as regional pilots, courier service pilots, or pilottrainers. They were thus not regarded as being substantially limited in their ability to work.69Murphy v. United Parcel Service70 concerned a truck mechanic with high blood pressure.
14His work with United Parcel Service required him to drive commercial vehicles which meant thathe had to obtain a Department of Transportation (DOT) health certificate. Although hishypertension was mitigated by prescription medication, his blood pressure remained sufficientlyelevated to prevent him from obtaining DOT certification. As a result, he was terminated byUnited Parcel Service. He claimed that this action contravened the ADA.The same seven-Justice majority that decided the Sutton case rejected Murphy’s claim.Justice O’Connor reiterated the fact that an impairment would only constitute an actual disabilityif, in the mitigated state, it substantially limited a major life activity.71 Since the blood pressuremedication taken by Murphy ameliorated the negative impact of his hypertension, he was notsubstantially limited due to that condition. The Court next had to decide whether United ParcelService regarded Murphy as disabled with respect to his ability to work by terminating himbecause of his failure to obtain DOT health certification. The Court reaffirmed the Sutton viewthat persons are only “regarded as” disabled with respect to their ability to work when they areconsidered unable to perform a class or range of jobs, but not when employers merely believethat they are precluded from performing particular jobs.72 The majority Justices noted that whileMurphy could not work as a mechanic for a firm requiring DOT health certification, he couldwork in various other mechanic positions that did not involve the driving of vehicles covered byDOT regulations. As a result, he was only considered by United Parcel Service to be unqualifiedfor a particular job and not a broad range of mechanic jobs, rendering him unprotected under theADA.73On the same day the Supreme Court issued its Sutton and Murphy decisions, it announcedits opinion in Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg.74 Kirkingburg was a truck driver who suffered
15from amblyopia, an uncorrectable eye condition that left him with 20/200 vision in one eyeeffectively leaving him with monocular vision.75 Despite this condition, Kirkingburg had learnedto compensate for his monocularity and was less affected than other people suffering fromamblyopia. Albertson’s hired Kirkingburg as a truck driver, a position that required a DOTfitness certification mandating a minimum corrected visual acuity of at least 20/40 in each eye..He was examined by a physician who erroneously certified him. Kirkingburg injured himself atwork and took some time off. When he returned to work, another eye examination discoveredthat he actually failed to satisfy the minimal DOT vision requirement. DOT told him he wouldhave to obtain a waiver, under a test program being conducted by DOT to determine if it shouldmodify its long-standing visual acuity standards, if he wished to continue to drive. He applied fora DOT waiver, but was terminated by Albertson’s, while his waiver petition was pending,because of the fact he failed to meet the usual DOT visual standard. Even though he wasthereafter granted a DOT waiver, Albertson’s refused to reemploy him. He filed suit under theADA. The District Court granted Albertson’s motion for summary judgement, because it foundthat Kirkingburg was not qualified to be a truck driver due to his visual impairment. The NinthCircuit Court of Appeals reversed, however, finding that Kirkingburg’s monocularity constituteda disability due to its impact on his ability to see. The Ninth Circuit failed to considerKirkingburg’s own measures taken to mitigate the impact of his amblyopia. The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the Ninth Circuit’s approach, holding that evenan individual’s personal mitigation efforts must be considered when determining whether animpairment substantially limits a major life activity. “We see no principled basis for
16distinguishing between measures undertaken with artificial aids, like medications and devices,and measures undertaken, whether consciously or not, with the body’s own systems.”76 While theCourt recognized that monocularity may be substantially limiting for some people, it might notbe for others who have learned to cope with it. Disability status should not be based on groupgeneralizations, but must be decided on a case-by-case basis considering the particularcircumstances affecting the claimant.77 While “people with monocular vision ‘ordinarily’ willmeet the Act’s definition of disability, . . . [w]e simply hold that the Act requires monocularindividuals, like others claiming the Act’s protection, to prove a disability by offering evidencethat the extent of the limitation in terms of their own experience, as in loss of depth perceptionand visual field, is substantial.”78The Albertson’s Court went on to consider whether Kirkingburg was “qualified” withinthe meaning of the ADA. It noted that covered entities may impose minimal standards forpositions that adversely affect disabled applicants, so long as those criteria are “job-related andconsistent with business necessity, and . . . performance cannot be accomplished by reasonableaccommodation . . .”79 The ADA specifically recognizes that employers may impose limitationsdesigned to ensure that “an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of otherindividuals in the workplace.”80 Even though the Ninth Circuit had indicated that the DOTwaiver program precluded Albertson’s from claiming that Kirkingburg was unable to perform hisdriving job safely, the Supreme Court rejected this reasoning.81 It noted that the waiver programwas experimental and concluded that Albertson’s had the right to rely on the long-standing DOTvisual acuity standards that Kirkingburg could not satisfy.82The most recent Supreme Court decision pertaining to the ADA definition of disability
17was issued last June. Toyota Motor v. Williams83 concerned a production line worker whodeveloped bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and bilateral tendinitis that significantly reduced herrange of motion and weight lifting capabilities.84 She was ultimately transferred from her enginefabricating assembly line position to a quality control team. Her team was initially responsible foronly paint inspections, and Williams was able to perform these tasks satisfactorily for a couple ofyears. Toyota finally decided that quality control teams had to perform other inspection tasks thatrequired workers to apply a light oil to the hood, fender, doors, rear quarter panel, and trunk ofpassing cars.85 These wiping duties compelled Williams to hold her hands and arms at shoulderheight for several hours at a time, and she began to experience pain in her neck and shoulders.She asked to be reassigned to the visual paint inspection tasks which she previously performed,but Toyota refused. She began to miss work and was eventually terminated. She filed a claimunder the ADA alleging that her impairments substantially limited her ability to perform manualtasks. The District Court rejected Williams’ ADA claim, finding that she had failed todemonstrate that she was substantially limited with respect to the major life activities ofperforming manual tasks or working.86 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding thatWilliams was substantially limited with regard to the performance of manual tasks associatedwith her work. A unanimous Supreme Court rejected the Sixth Circuit’s approach.The Supreme Court initially noted that Congress intended the term “disability” under theADA to be interpreted in accordance with the regulatory interpretations that had been establishedunder the Rehabilitation Act.87 Nonetheless, “[m]erely having an impairment does not make onedisabled for purposes of the ADA. Claimants also need to demonstrate that the impairment limits
18a major life activity.”88 The HEW regulations listed various “major life activities,” including theperformance of manual tasks.89 Although the HEW regulations do not define the term“substantially limits,” EEOC regulations do provide guidance in this area.[S]ubstantially limited” means “[u]nable to perform a major lifeactivity that the average person in the general population canperform”; or “[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner,or duration under which an individual can perform a particularmajor life activity as compared to the . . . manner . . . under whichthe average person in the general population can perform that samemajor life activity.90When evaluating substantially limiting claims, “the following factors should be considered:‘[t]he nature and severity of the impairment; [t]he duration or expected duration of theimpairment; and [t]he permanent or long-term impact or the expected permanent or long-termimpact of or resulting from the impairment.’”91The Court first evaluated Williams’ claim that she was substantially limited in her abilityto work. Although the Court again refused to hold that work was a major life activity, it assumedthat is was for analytical purposes.92 It reiterated the view that persons are only substantiallylimited with respect to work when they can demonstrate the inability to perform a class of jobs ora broad range of jobs, and the Court intimated, without deciding, that Williams’ condition wasnot so expansively limiting.93 It then held that the Sixth Circuit had erred when it evaluatedWilliams’ ability to perform manual tasks associated with her work. The Court indicated that thelower court should have instead assessed her capacity to perform “the variety of tasks central tomost people’s daily lives, not . . . [those] associated with her specific job.”94  Since Williams wasstill able to brush her teeth, wash her face, bathe, tend her flower garden, fix breakfast, dolaundry, and pick up around the house, the Court found that her impairment did not substantially
19limit her ability to perform the manual tasks associated with everyday life.95Two other 2002 Supreme Court decisions also concerned the scope of employmentdiscrimination protection available under the ADA. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal96 involvedan oil refinery worker with Hepatitis C which affected his liver. He was employed byindependent contractors to work at an oil refinery owned by Chevron U.S.A., and he twice soughtemployment directly with Chevron U.S.A. at that facility. Chevron U.S.A. rejected hisapplications because of his Hepatitis C, and it finally asked the independent contractor for whichhe was then working not to assign him to jobs that exposed him to toxins that might exacerbatehis liver condition.97 After the contractor laid Echazabal off, he filed a claim against ChevronU.S.A. under the ADA. Chevron U.S.A. defended under an EEOC regulation permittingemployers to deny people positions that would pose a “direct threat” to their own health.98 TheDistrict Court accepted this Chevron U.S.A. defense, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appealsreversed. It held that the statutory exception contained in the ADA was limited to situations inwhich impaired individuals would pose a direct threat to the health or safety of others in theworkplace.99 Since Echazabal’s condition merely posed a threat to his own health, his situationdid not fall within this provision.A unanimous Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s approach. It acknowledged thatthe statutory exception was limited to circumstances in which an impaired person posed a directthreat to others, but found that the EEOC regulation extending the exclusion to persons posing adirect threat to themselves constituted an acceptable interpretation of the statute’s generalqualification standards.100  To prevent unreasonably paternalistic attitudes to limit theemployment opportunities of disabled individuals, the Court indicated that “[t]he direct threat
20defense must be ‘based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medicalknowledge and/or the best available objective evidence,’ and upon an expressly ‘individualizedassessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of thejob.’”101 The case was remanded to the lower courts to allow them to determine the seriousnessof any risk the oil refinery work would pose to Echazabal’s liver condition.In US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,102 the Supreme Court had to determine the impact ofemployer-established seniority rules on the statutory duty of covered firms to offer disabledindividuals reasonable accommodations that could be provided without undue hardship. Barnettwas a cargo handler who injured his back.103 He was transferred to a less physically demandingmailroom position that he was able to perform. The mailroom position was subject to periodicbidding under the US Airways seniority system. When the position became open for bidding twoyears after Barnett first occupied it, he learned that two workers with greater seniority wereseeking it. He asked US Airways to make an exception for him due to his back injury, but USAirways refused to do so. Barnett claimed that US Airways thus violated its duty to offer him areasonable accommodation for his back condition.The District Court rejected Barnett’s ADA claim, holding that the need for US Airways tomodify its established seniority system would have created an “undue hardship.”104 The NinthCircuit reversed, holding that the existence of a seniority system was simply a factor to beconsidered in the undue hardship analysis. The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’sapproach.The Court initially noted that the ADA requires employers to offer reasonableaccommodations to individuals with disabilities, including reassignment to vacant positions,
21where such accommodations can be accomplished without undue hardship.105 US Airways citedits seniority system and argued that any accommodation that would conflict with establishedseniority expectations would be “unreasonable.” Even though the US Airways seniority systemwas unilaterally established, and did not result from a collective bargaining relationship, and USAirways “reserve[d] the right to change any and all” aspects of the system at will, the Courtdecided to treat all established seniority systems similarly.106 While a modification of seniorityexpectations may not adversely affect employer interests, it would have a significant impact on worker expectations.107  As a result, while proposed accommodations that would conflict withestablished seniority policies would not constitute undue hardships to the affected employers,they would usually be “unreasonable” because of the adverse effects on the expectations of moresenior employees.108The Court thus established a presumption that proposed accommodations that would alterworker expectations under established seniority systems would be “unreasonable.” To overcomethis presumption, claimants would have to demonstrate either that the employer so frequentlymakes changes in the system that employee expectations are minimal or that the system containsso many exceptions that one more exception will not unduly affect worker interests.109 Undersuch circumstances, a proposed exception to seniority rights may be found to constitute a“reasonable” accommodation. The case was remanded to the lower courts to allow Barnett topresent any evidence that might overcome the presumption that his proposed accommodationwas unreasonable because of its conflict with the established seniority system,
IV.   EVALUATION OF SUPREME COURT APPROACH
22The Supreme Court appears to be concerned about two aspects of the employmentdiscrimination protections contained in the ADA. First, the Court seems to think that Congresswent too far in extending such expansive protection to millions of individuals with physical andmental impairments. Second, the Court apparently fears that if claimants are found disabledwithin the meaning of the ADA, they will obtain or retain positions they are not fully capable ofperforming. The short response to the Court’s first concern is that it is none of the Court’sbusiness. If Justices are not satisfied with particular legislation, they should run for Congress andtry to amend the statute they find offensive. As members of the judiciary, they should feelobliged to interpret and apply the statutory provisions as they think Congress intended them to beapplied – even if they do not like the results.The Court’s second concern fails to appreciate the entire scope of the ADA. The statute isnot as expansive as the Justices may fear. Its protections are limited to persons with conditionsthat substantially limit one or more major life activities. People who are only moderately affectedare not covered, unless they are discriminated against because of records of prior impairments orbecause they are regarded as having substantially limiting impairments they do not actually have.Furthermore, even if individuals are substantially limited, the ADA does not guarantee thememployment. They must be able to demonstrate that they are “qualified” employment candidates.The Supreme Court thus ignores the true paradox associated with the employment discriminationprovisions of the ADA. You have to be so significantly limited by your condition to be protectedthat you are often unable, with or without an accommodation, to perform the essential functionsof the job.110 In addition, if proposed accommodations are found to be “unreasonable” or toconstitute “undue hardships,” the claimants will be denied protection. As a direct result of the
23Supreme Court’s judicial narrowing of ADA coverage, Disability Act plaintiffs win less oftenthan plaintiffs seeking redress under other Federal anti-discrimination statutes.111A third factor may also underlie the Supreme Court’s parsimonious approach to ADAcases – the expanding civil rights docket of federal district courts. The number of employmentdiscrimination complaints filed in district courts almost tripled over the past decade from 8413 in1990 to 22,412 in 1999.112 These claims accounted for 8.6 percent of civil actions filed in districtcourts in 1999.113 Plaintiffs prevailed in fewer than one-third of the cases culminating in verdicts,generating median awards of $137,000 in 1998.114 Part of the increased civil rights caseload isattributable to the enactment of the ADA in 1990. Judges frequently complain privately about thehigh volume of employment discrimination claims that produce relatively modest awards forprevailing plaintiffs. They hate to spend substantial judicial time on such cases.If the Supreme Court establishes narrow coverage standards for ADA plaintiffs, it canincrease the number of employment discrimination cases that can be disposed of thoughdefendant summary judgment motions. The most effective way to accomplish this objective is todefine “disability” narrowly, as the Court has done. If lower courts are required to determinewhether disabled persons are qualified to perform essential job functions, with or withoutreasonable accommodations, these fact-specific inquiries would make it difficult for trial courtsto dispose of these cases through summary judgment motions. Additional proceedings would berequired that would often culminate in bench or jury trials.In Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp.,115 the Supreme Court could havefurther reduced the need for trials in ADA cases involving plaintiffs who had previously soughtSocial Security disability benefits claiming to be totally unable to work. The lower courts had
24held that people who file ADA law suits after they had applied for Social Security disabilitybenefits should generally have their ADA claims dismissed, because their ADA assertions ofdiscrimination against qualified disabled individuals were contradicted by their prior SocialSecurity disability claims.116 Although the Supreme Court could have accepted this approach todefeat most ADA discrimination claims filed by people who had previously asserted totallydisabling conditions for Social Security purposes, it chose not to do so. The Cleveland Courtacknowledged the fact that Social Security administrators determine how disabled applicants arewithout regard to whether they could perform essential job functions with the aid ofaccommodations, while the ADA expressly obliges covered entities to offer disabled jobcandidates reasonable accommodations whenever they are available.117 Thus claimants could betotally disabled for Social Security purposes, yet remain employable for ADA purposes. TheCourt went on to suggest, however, that ADA plaintiffs who had previously filed disabilityclaims with the Social Security Administration would have to provide courts with explanationsthat would be “sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror’s concluding that, assuming the truth of,or the plaintiff’s good-faith belief in, the earlier statement, the plaintiff could nonetheless‘perform the essential functions’ of [the] job, with or without reasonable accommodation.’”118The Cleveland Court has thus made it fairly easy for district courts to grant defendant summaryjudgment motions in these cases, except when plaintiffs can convince trial judges that their priorSocial Security disability assertions are not entirely inconsistent with their current ADAemployment discrimination allegations.
A.  DEFINITION OF ‘DISABILITY”
25The ADA defines “disability” to include: (1) individuals with impairments thatsubstantially limit one or more major life activities; (2) persons with a record of suchimpairment; and (3) people who are “regarded as” being so impaired.119 Under the actuallydisabled prong, claimants must establish three critical factors: (1) they have physical or mentalimpairments (2) that are substantially limiting (3) with respect to some major life activity. Thefirst part of this proof construct is generally straight forward. Physical and mental impairmentsinclude medical conditions that are recognized by physicians as psysiological or psychologicaldisorders. ADA claimants generally present expert medical testimony to establish thisprerequisite to coverage.The second factor requires proof that the demonstrated impairments are substantiallylimiting with regard to some major life activity. EEOC regulations have borrowed from HEWregulations under the Rehabilitation Act to list as “major life activities” “caring for one’s self,performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, andworking.”120 Although the first eight are relatively uncontroversial, the Court has had a moredifficult time with the ninth: “working.” In cases like Sutton, the Court initially questionedwhether the EEOC had the regulatory authority under the ADA to promulgate regulationsdefining the term “disability,” because the EEOC’s authority extends to the employmentdiscrimination provisions of that statute and the definitions are set forth in the preliminarysections of the Act.121 Since the employment discrimination section only covers individuals with“disabilities,” it would be incongruous to deny the EEOC the power to adopt regulationsindicating which medical conditions fall within the statute’s general coverage. So long as theEEOC regulations defining “disability” are consistent with the statutory language the agency is
26explaining, the EEOC interpretations should be accorded judicial deference since promulgated by the expert agency given the authority to interpret the relevant sections of the act.122The EEOC’s inclusion of “working” as a “major life activity” should similarly beconsidered uncontroversial.123 For members of the active labor force, their employment is criticalto their economic and emotional well-being. People’s identities are directly affected by theirwork. So are their financial circumstances. If this factor were not alone sufficient to convince theCourt to accept working as a major life activity, the fact that Congress expressly proscribeddiscrimination against qualified disabled individuals under the Title I of the ADA shouldemphasize the critical nature of employment in that statutory scheme. If working is notconsidered a major life activity, this would seriously undermine the entire employmentdiscrimination portion of the ADA. There are individuals whose impairments do not substantiallylimit them with respect to other major life activities, but do substantially limit them with regardto their ability to work.124 Congress clearly intended to protect such people.The most significant part of the Sutton decision concerns the impact of mitigatingmeasures on the substantially limiting portion of the disability definition. Although EEOC andDepartment of Justice regulations indicated that the disability question should be answeredwithout regard to mitigating factors,125 I find myself in agreement with the Sutton majority – butnot for the identical reasons. They were concerned that if disability determinations were to bemade considering the unmitigated status of claimants, courts would be forced to deal with purelyhypothetical circumstances. They would have to speculate about how limited the individualswould be if their impairments were not ameliorated through medication, eye glasses, hearingaids, or prostheses. Such an approach would not be that speculative. Expert witnesses would be
27asked to evaluate claimants in their unmitigated state and testify how those particular personswould be limited with respect to major life activities. How well would a visually impaired personfunction without corrective lenses? How mobile would a person be without a prosthesis or awheelchair?  How would a diabetic or person with a bi-polar condition function withoutprescription medication? It would not be that difficult for judges or juries to determine the degreeto which impaired claimants would be affected in their unmitigated state.Why then do I agree with the Sutton Court’s decision to make disability determinationsconsidering claimants in their mitigated state? The first prong of the ADA’s disability definitiononly protects persons with conditions that are substantially limiting. If the adverse effects ofmedical impairments can be significantly diminished through appliances or medications, thepersons with those conditions would not be truly limited.126 It is thus apparent that theadministrative regulations requiring courts to decide whether medical conditions are substantiallylimiting without regard to ameliorative measures are inconsistent with the express language ofthe ADA. If mitigating measures enable otherwise impaired people to function relativelynormally, they can hardly be considered disabled under the first prong of the statutory definition.Support for this interpretation is provided by Professor Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., a disability rightsadvocate who drafted the original ADA bill introduced in Congress. In an extensive articlepublished the year after the ADA was enacted, he indicated that conditions controlled throughmitigating measures would not be considered covered.127Even with some “traditional” disabilities, it may not be easy toshow that a condition significantly limits a major life activity.Conditions such as epilepsy, controlled by medication; diabetes, inwhich insulin treatment is progressing routinely; cancer, multiplesclerosis and other conditions during periods of remission;
28cosmetic disfigurements such as facial scars or deformities; lower-leg amputations where the individual has a properly fitted prosthesis; and many other conditionstraditionally considered to be “disabilities” may not have a substantial impact on performance ofmajor life activities.128Erica Worth Harris has similarly acknowledged that persons with mitigated conditions should not be accorded ADA coverage under the first prong:Individuals with controlled impairments do not suffer from afundamental difference in living historically and have not beensubjected to discrimination. No social stigmas attach to controlledimpairments precisely because they are controlled. No stereotypesor misperceptions attach to controlled impairments because theyhave no obvious effect on the daily activities on the individuals.129Ms. Harris has also noted that even if impaired individuals were evaluated in theirunmitigated states to determine initial statutory coverage, firms would be under a statutory dutyto provide them with reasonable accommodations for their conditions.130 The most obviousaccommodations for such persons would be to provide them with the mitigation measures thatwould, under the Sutton approach, render them non-disabled. While this is correct, this approachdiffers in one critical aspect from the Sutton Court’s approach. Under Sutton, people whoseimpairments can be controlled through mitigating measures are not “disabled.” Under therejected EEOC approach, however, such persons would be found disabled if their unmitigatedconditions were substantially limiting, necessitating reasonable accommodations for theirimpairments. As a result, employers that discriminated against them because of their unmitigatedstates would be in violation of the ADA. Nonetheless, because of the fact the ADA definitionrequires proof of actual limitations, I find the Sutton Court’s pronouncement with respect to theimpact of mitigating measures to be defensible.Where impairments actually do diminish the capacity of people to perform various job
29tasks, when should these persons be considered disabled for ADA purposes? As the Sutton Courtrecognized, the applicable EEOC regulation requires proof that the adversely affected people are“significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs invarious classes . . .”131  For some purposes, the first part of this regulatory definition should becontrolling, while for others the second part should be pertinent.For individuals with general employment skills, they should only be consideredsubstantially limited with respect to their ability to work where they are unable to perform “abroad range of jobs.” If their skills and background render them qualified to perform differentjobs despite their inability to perform some jobs, they should not be treated as disabled. On theother hand, individuals with highly specialized training relevant to a particular “class of jobs”should be entitled to statutory protection when impairments substantially limit their capacity towork in that class of jobs.The Sutton sisters had extremely focused training; they were jet pilots. They hoped toobtain high-paying global pilot positions with a major air line. In the civilian setting, these skillswere primarily for commercial flying positions. While their vision was normal when they woreglasses, their uncorrected visual acuity failed to meet usual air line standards. This caused themto be disqualified from an entire class of jobs – that of global pilot. If their myopia rendered themineligible for global pilot positions with commercial air lines, they should have been considered“substantially limited” with regard to this “class of jobs.” As such, the Sutton Court should havefound them subject to ADA coverage. Even though they could have worked as regional pilots oras pilot trainers, they had not obtained their extensive training merely to qualify them for suchlower-paying occupations.
30If the Sutton sisters had been found disabled, would they ipso facto have been entitled topilot positions with United? Not necessarily. They would still have had to demonstrate that, withor without a reasonable accommodation, they could have performed the essential functions of thejob safely and efficiently. As we shall explore in the next section, it is not clear whether theycould have carried this burden.The Murphy case provides a perfect example of a claimant whose situation had to beevaluated with respect to his ability to perform “a broad range of jobs.”  Murphy was a truckmechanic. Because of high blood pressure, Murphy could not obtain the commercial license heneeded to work on trucks for United Parcel Service. Despite Murphy’s hypertension, he was ableto work as a mechanic for various firms that did not require him to have a commercial license.Given his training and experience, he was thus not substantially limited with respect to “a broadrange of jobs.”The Kirkingburg case raised more complex issues. Although the Supreme Court wascorrect in considering mitigation measures undertaken through the claimant’s own body system,it failed to fully appreciate the impact of monocular vision on a person’s ability to see. Kirkingburg’s self-correction efforts may have minimized the impact of his amblyopia on hisability to see things at a distance, those efforts would have been of minimal help with respect todepth perception at short distances.132 This fact should have induced the Court to acknowledgethat he was still substantially limited with respect to his ability to see compared to people withoutsuch an impairment.  The Court implicitly conceded this point, since it went on to determinewhether Kirkingburg was “qualified” for truck driving positions with Albertson’s.Should Kirkingburg have been found disabled because of the impact of his amblyopia on
31his ability to work? He was a truck driver with general employment skills. Although he could notdrive for Albertson’s because of his inability to satisfy minimal DOT vision standards, hisdistance vision was not severely affected. There is thus every reason to believe that he could haveobtained other driving positions that did not require DOT certification. In addition, he may havebeen qualified to perform various non-driving jobs that would not have required short-distancedepth perception. Unless he could have demonstrated the inability to perform “a broad range ofjobs” for someone with his education, training, and experience, he should not have beenconsidered disabled with respect to the impact of his amblyopia on his capacity to work.The Williams case provides another example of someone who should have to demonstratethat she was unable to perform “a broad range of jobs” before she would be entitled to ADAcoverage. Williams had a general education and was trained to perform production line work.With this background, she could presumably have worked for various manufacturing firms, orcould have used her general skills in the service sector. As a result, it would not have beensufficient for her to show that she could no longer work for Toyota. She would have had to provethe inability to work in “a broad range of” manufacturing and/or service jobs.In the actual case, Williams did not try to establish Disability Act protection using themajor life activity of working. She instead relied upon her inability to perform manual tasks. Hadshe tried to fit her situation within the working life activity, she should have been consideredcovered. With rather severe bilateral carpel tunnel syndrome and bilateral tendinitis, she couldhardly use her hands and arms, and found it painful to lift her arms above her shoulders.133 Theselimitations rendered her incapable of performing most production jobs, most office or clericaljobs, and most retail or service jobs. As such, she was substantially limited with regard to her
32ability to work in “a broad range of jobs” commensurate with her training and experience.The Supreme Court also erred when it found that Williams had not established that shewas substantially limited with respect to her ability to perform manual tasks. Even though shecould brush her teeth, comb her hair, clean, cook, and wash with some difficulty, she wasseverely restricted regarding her ability to perform these basic tasks compared to members of thegeneral population. Short of a total loss of the use of both hands and arms, it would be difficult toimagine a more severely impaired person. It was thus incongruous for the Court to find her notdisabled. Had it done so, however, she would still have had a difficult time proving that she was“qualified” to work for Toyota.As the “Supreme Legislature” judicially narrowed the ADA definition of “disability,” itrepeatedly cited the first section of the ADA estimating the number of disabled persons in theU.S. to be 43,000,000.134 While they reworked the operative ADA language, the Justices ignoredboth this legislative finding and the expansive congressional purpose underlying the ADA. Giventhe Court’s parsimonious interpretive decisions, it is likely that far fewer than 43,000,000Americans are now covered under the first prong of that Act’s disability definition. Although theCourt found it appropriate to cite that figure when it worked to limit coverage, it wholly ignoredit when the congressional finding no longer supported its statutory construction.Even when claimants are not actually limited because of the availability of mitigatingmeasures, they may be “regarded as” disabled under the third prong of the statutory definition. InSutton, the Court suggested two situations in which persons may be “regarded as” disabled: “(1)a covered entity mistakenly believes that a person has a physical [or mental] impairment thatsubstantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly believes
33that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities.”135One could logically argue that employers that refuse to employ impaired people (orpersons they think are impaired)  because of their medical conditions (or perceived medicalconditions)  “regard” such persons as being “disabled.” When Congress enacted the ADA withits three-prong definition of “disability,” it was as concerned with persons who were consideredby covered entities to be disabled as with individuals who are actually disabled. This was basedupon the reasonable belief that common prejudices, misperceptions, and ignorant stereotypes,about people with non-disabling physical and mental impairments could be as devastating asactually disabling conditions.136 This concern induced Congress to include the third prong in thedefinition of “disability,” to protect non-disabled people who are “regarded as” disabled byunthinking or wrong-thinking parties.137If every impairment or perceived impairment relied upon by covered entities to denypeople employment were considered covered under the “regarded as” prong, the vast majority ofindividuals denied employment opportunities could file ADA claims. They could assert that theirwearing of glasses, slight birth marks, minimal limps, or minor depression caused them to bedenied these opportunities because they were “regarded as” disabled. Such an approach wouldcreate an intolerable burden for both the EEOC and the courts. It would also go beyond anythingthat Congress could have imagined. As a result, the Sutton Court was probably correct in limitingthe scope of the third prong to situations in which employers believe non-disabling conditions aresubstantially limiting or they mistakenly think that individuals have impairments that would besubstantially limiting if they actually had them.Although I agree with the general standards enunciated by the Sutton Court to delineate
34the scope of the “regarded as” prong of the disability definition, I think the Court has applied itsstandards in an overly narrow manner. In Sutton, Murphy, and Kirkingburg, the Court recognizedthat particular employers may have refused to employ the claimants because of perceiveddisabilities. Since the Court assumed, however, that positions with other firms not so predisposedcould be obtained, the Court found that the negative presumptions of the defendant-employersdid not substantially limit the ability of the claimants to obtain employment in “a wide range ofjobs.” The Court should have acknowledged the likelihood that other covered firms may haveshared the same stereotypical beliefs as did United Air Lines, Albertson’s, and United ParcelService. The Court should thus have asked whether such widely-held stereotypical beliefsconcerning persons with the conditions affecting the claimants would have substantially limitedtheir chances of obtaining employment in a class or range of jobs.138 If so, the Court should havefound that these individuals were “regarded as” disabled with respect to their ability to work.139As noted earlier, the inquiry with respect to the Sutton sisters should have been limited to theirability to gain employment as global pilots, since that was the real class of jobs for which theyhad been trained. For Murphy and Kirkingburg, the inquiry should have been more expansivedue to their more generalized backgrounds as a mechanic and a truck driver.Had the Supreme Court approached the Sutton, Murphy, and Kirkingburg cases moreappropriately, the Justices would have found the claimants to be actually disabled under the firstprong or “regarded as” disabled under the third prong. I should parenthetically note that while theCourt should clearly have found Williams disabled under the first prong because of thesubstantially limiting impact of her impairments on her ability to perform manual tasks and to
35work in most jobs for which she was qualified, she could also have established statutorycoverage under the “regarded as” prong due to the fact Toyota thought she could no longerperform basic manual tasks and essential job functions. Nonetheless, the Court’s apparentunderlying fear that such findings would have enabled these individuals to obtain or retain thepositions in question was erroneous. These claimants would still have been required todemonstrate that they were qualified, with or without reasonable accommodations, to perform theessential functions of the positions they sought.
B.  QUALIFIED TO PERFORM THE ESSENTIAL JOB FUNCTIONSWhen ADA claimants establish that they are actually disabled, they gain generalDisability Act coverage. Nonetheless, they are a long way from prevailing on their employmentdiscrimination claims. It is not unlawful to discriminate against disabled persons – only todiscriminate against qualified disabled people.140 A “qualified individual with a disability” isdefined narrowly to include only those persons with disabilities “who, with or without reasonableaccommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position[s]” they hold ordesire.141If individual disabilities pose a direct threat to the health or safety of others or tothemselves, are they “qualified” under the ADA? For example, disabled persons may wish tooperate equipment that could injure other people if they had seizures or fainting spells. Air linepilots or vehicle drivers with vision problems that cannot be fully corrected through glasses orsurgery may pose a greater risk to members of the diving public than unimpaired drivers. Peoplewith serious contagious diseases may threaten to infect coworkers or customers. Section
3612113(b)142 explicitly states that “qualification standards” may include a requirement thatdisabled persons “not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in theworkplace.” Whenever such threats to others can be established, the adversely affected disabledpeople will be found unqualified – unless reasonable accommodations could be adopted withoutundue hardship that would eliminate the risk to others.Suppose the risk is only to the disabled individuals themselves? Exposure to certainsubstances may exacerbate existing conditions. Persons subject to seizures could be seriouslyinjured if they had an attack while working on elevated platforms or scaffolding. Individuals withliver or kidney problems may have their conditions adversely affected by exposure to toxicsubstances. Should “paternalistic” employers be able to reject such people to protect them fromtheir own impairments, or should they be allowed to assume the risks generated by their ownconditions? In United Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,143 the Supreme Courtrejected an employer’s effort to restrict the employment of fertile female employees in areas thatwould expose them to elevated lead levels, because such exposure might cause birth defects intheir offspring. The Court held that under the Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment to TitleVII,144 firms could only establish employment requirements that affected the ability of employeesto perform their job tasks. They could not impose standards designed to protect children whomay be born to employees. Congress indicated that the employer may take into account onlythe woman’s ability to get her job done. . . . [T]he decision tobecome pregnant or to work while being either pregnant or capableof becoming pregnant was reserved for each individual woman tomake for herself. . . . [Title VII] prohibit[s] an employer fromdiscriminating against a woman because of her capacity to becomepregnant, unless her reproductive potential prevents her from
37performing the duties of her job.145Should the Johnson Control’s reasoning apply to individuals whose disabilities pose adirect threat to their own health or safety? In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal,146 the SupremeCourt acknowledged the fact that the ADA exception in Section 12113(b) is limited to directthreats to others, but concluded that the EEOC regulation extending a statutory exclusionexclusion to persons posing direct threats to themselves was a reasonable interpretation of theADA’s general qualification standards.147 To avail themselves of this exception without undulyrestricting the employment rights of disabled persons, employers would have to make “anindividualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essentialfunctions of the job.”148Echazabal can be easily distinguished from Johnson Controls. Echazabal involved animpairment that posed a direct threat to the disabled worker himself, while Johnson Controlsconcerned only the potential children of present workers. Echazabal could not perform hisregular job functions without risking harm to himself. The Court thus decided that this direct riskto the employee himself affected his qualification for the job. Johnson Controls, on the otherhand, did not pertain to any situation that might harm the employee herself – merely thepossibility of harm to her future offspring. The Johnson Controls’ Court thus held that theclaimant’s employer had no right to limit her employment based on the potential risk to her non-employee children.The ADA does not expressly define the term “essential functions of the job.”  It doesindicate, however, that “consideration shall be given to the employer’s judgment as to whatfunctions of a job are essential.”149 This provision further states that “if an employer has prepared
38a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this descriptionshall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job.”150 Congress has thus providedemployers with substantial latitude with respect to the determination of essential job functions.When firms create job descriptions, they must decide which duties are basic to the positions inquestion. What functions should candidates be able to perform or learn to perform if they are tooccupy these positions? So long as employers define these functions reasonably, theirdescriptions are entitled to judicial deference. Only where claimants can demonstrate that definedjob duties are of a wholly tangential or secondary nature should courts find them non-essential.Many disabled job candidates have some difficulty performing essential job functionswithout modifications to the positions they seek. As a result, the ADA makes it unlawful forcovered firms to fail to make “reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mentallimitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . ., unless such covered entitycan demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation ofthe business . . .”151 “Reasonable accommodations” may include making facilities accessible, jobrestructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to vacant positions,acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, the provision of qualified readers, andsimilar arrangements.152Most accommodations are neither extensive nor expensive.153 The height of the workstation may be raised or lowered, or a higher or lower chair may be provided A doorway may bewidened to allow access to people with mobility difficulties. Ancillary job tasks may bereassigned to other persons, or  disabled employees may be placed in vacant positions they canperform.
39Once employers know that applicants or current workers have disabling conditions thatlimit their ability to perform certain job tasks, they must consider possible accommodations. TheADA does not require employers to adopt the best accommodations, the ones that would have theleast impact on disabled individuals, or the ones preferred by those persons.154 It merely requirescovered firms to provide “a reasonable accommodation” that will enable disabled people toperform the essential functions of the jobs in question.155 If employers fail to offer anyaccommodations, it is incumbent upon disabled claimants to demonstrate that someaccommodation could have been provided.156 At that point, defendant-employers have threeoptions: (1) they may accept the candidate-proposed accommodation; (2) they may offer thatperson an alternative accommodation; or (3) they may demonstrate that the suggestedaccommodation would involve an “undue hardship.”157When current employees develop disabling conditions that make it impossible for them tocontinue in their existing jobs, they may request transfers to other positions they think they canperform. It is clear under the ADA that their employers need not displace other workers toaccommodate their transfer desires. Section 12111(9)(B) expressly limits reassignmentaccommodations to “vacant” positions.158What should employers do when disabled employees request transfers to vacant positionsthat are being sought by other more senior coworkers who claim to have a right to the positionsin question? Such seniority rights may be defined in bargaining agreements negotiated withrepresentative labor organizations, or they may be set forth in plans unilaterally adopted by firmswithout labor unions. In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,159 the Supreme Court held thatthe obligation to accommodate the religious beliefs of employees imposed by Section 701(j) of
40Title VII160 does not require employers to violate seniority rights set forth in collective bargainingagreements. In US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,161 the Supreme Court extended this rule to non-bargained seniority plans. “[I]t would not be reasonable in the run of cases that the assignment inquestion trump the rules of a seniority system. To the contrary, it will ordinarily be unreasonablefor the [disabled claimant’s requested] assignment to prevail.”162The Court has thus established a presumption that accommodations that wouldnecessitate exceptions to even unilaterally-adopted employer seniority policies would beconsidered “unreasonable.” This would be true even where the rights created under theemployer’s system are not legally enforceable.163 Only where claimants can show that employer-established seniority plans are so changeable that they have not created reasonable seniorityexpectations in employees may exceptions to those plans be found “reasonable.” To accomplishthis objective, claimants would have to prove either that the employer has retained the right tochange the plan unilaterally and has exercised this prerogative frequently or the program containsso many stated exceptions that it would not be unreasonable to allow another for disabledworkers.164When might otherwise reasonable accommodations be considered inappropriate becauseof the “undue hardship” they would impose on business firms? Although Congress was aware ofthe fact the Supreme Court in Hardison had indicated that any proposed accommodation foremployee religious convictions under Title VII would constitute an “undue hardship” if itentailed more than a “de minimis” economic burden,165 it rejected that narrow approach in theADA. It chose to create a sliding scale that requires courts to make individualized assessmentsconsidering the impact of proposed accommodations on particular firms and facilities.166 Courts
41must evaluate the nature and cost of proposed accommodations measured against the overallfinancial resources of the facility involved and of the overall covered entity, the type of operationand the number of people employed at the facility in question, and the impact of the suggestedaccommodation on operations at that facility.More prosperous firms will be obliged to spend greater amounts of money beforeproposed accommodations may be found to constitute “undue hardships.” While a smallcompany may not have to hire a personal reader for a blind employee, a larger entity may beexpected to do so. Employer hardship claims must also consider the actual impact of thesuggested accommodation on the facility involved. Are there sufficient workers to allow non-essential job functions to be reassigned to others? Could coworkers assist disabled employeeswith their performance of particular job tasks? Courts must carefully analyze these types ofinquiries to determine whether proposed accommodations would impose undue hardships onspecific firms.Even if ADA claimants are able to demonstrate that they possess physical or mentalimpairments that are sufficiently limiting to bring them within the judicially-narrowed scope ofADA coverage and they establish that, with or without accommodations, they could perform theessential functions of the jobs they seek, they will not necessarily prevail. Unlike Section 503 ofthe Rehabilitation Act which requires federal contractors to “take affirmative action to employand advance in employment qualified individuals with disabilities,”167 the operative section of theADA merely prohibits discrimination against qualified disabled persons because of theirimpairments.168 It is thus clear that the ADA does not require employers to provide disabled jobcandidates with preferential treatment – except to the limited extent covered entities are obliged
42to provide disabled people with reasonable accommodations where available.169 The ADA thusallows employers to make comparative assessments among qualified candidates – even if one ormore candidates are disabled – and to prefer the more qualified individuals.170 In the absence ofproof that employers have impermissibly considered the impairments of the disabled candidates,those individuals would be unable to successfully prosecute ADA claims against the firms thatselected non-disabled persons they considered more qualified. The Supreme Court’s apparentfear that the ADA could, if not judicially constrained, undermine the merit principles underlyingthe American capitalist system are thus completely unfounded.
V.   CONCLUSIONThe enactment of the ADA in 1990 seemed to extend broad employment discriminationprotection to individuals with disabling conditions or records of impairments, or who areregarded as disabled. Congress recognized that many Americans are actually disabled, whilemany more persons with non-disabling conditions are adversely affected by misperceptions andignorant stereotypes regarding impaired people. The Supreme Court apparently believes that thediscrimination protections created by the ADA are unduly expansive. It has thus chosen tointerpret the applicable ADA provisions in ways that severely restrict statutory coverage. TheCourt has inexplicably refused to formally acknowledge that working constitutes a major lifeactivity, despite the inclusion of working in EEOC regulations and the fact that Title I of theADA protects the employment rights of disabled individuals. The Court has further rejectedadministrative regulations mandating that the impact of medical impairments be determined intheir uncorrected or unmitigated state. 
43Where the ability of disabled claimants to work has been in issue, the Court has requiredthem to prove that their impairments substantially limit their capacity to perform a wide range ofjobs, not just the ones they have been performing. Even significantly limited persons have beenfound non-disabled. The Court has created the Sutton paradox: Only severely limited individualsmay establish that they are disabled under the Act, and if they succeed, their limitations are likelyto render them unqualified for the positions they seek.The Supreme Court has also narrowed the scope of the “regarded as” prong of thedisability definition. It is not sufficient that employers rely upon misperceptions or ignorantstereotypes to disqualify candidates who could perform the requisite job tasks. Adverselyaffected claimants are only entitled to statutory protection if they can demonstrate that the firmsthought their impairments were substantially limiting, even though they were not, or believedthat they had conditions that would have been substantially limiting if they actually had thoseimpairments. This interpretation continues to deny employment to qualified disabled peoplebased on the very stereotypes and misperceptions Congress hoped to eradicate through itsenactment of the ADA.The Supreme Court has ignored the fact that many disabled individuals may workeffectively with minimal accommodations. It has also forgotten that the employment sections ofthe ADA do not require employers to prefer impaired candidates over more qualified non-impaired candidates. The operative provisions merely prohibit discrimination because ofdisabling conditions. Even if more expansive ADA coverage were available, covered firms couldcontinue to hire and retain the most qualified persons.
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